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TOM EAGLETON AND THE “CURSE TO OUR CONSTITUTION” 
WILLIAM H. FREIVOGEL* 
INTRODUCTION 
If my friend Tom Eagleton had lived a few more months, I’m sure he 
would have been amazed—and amused in a Tom Eagleton sort of way—by the 
astonishing story of Alberto Gonzales’s late night visit to John Ashcroft’s 
hospital bed in 2004 to persuade the then Attorney General to reauthorize the 
President’s warrantless wiretapping program.  No vignette better encapsulates 
President George W. Bush’s perversion of the rule of law. 
Not since the Saturday Night Massacre during Watergate has there been a 
moment when a President’s insistence on having his way resulted in such 
chaos at the upper reaches of the Justice Department.  James Comey, the 
Deputy Attorney General and a loyal Republican, told Congress in May 2007 
how he raced to George Washington Hospital with “sirens blaring” to beat 
Gonzales to Ashcroft’s room.1  Comey had telephoned FBI Director Robert S. 
Mueller to ask that he too come to the hospital to back up the Justice 
Department’s view that the President’s still secret program should not be 
reauthorized as it then operated; Ashcroft, Comey, and Mueller held firm in the 
face of intense pressure from White House Counsel Gonzales and Chief of 
Staff Andrew Card.2  Before the episode was over, the three were on the verge 
of tendering their resignations if the White House ignored their objections; the 
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the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for thirty-four years, serving as deputy Washington bureau chief and 
deputy editorial editor.  He covered the U.S. Supreme Court while in Washington.  A series of 
editorials he wrote in 2001 about Attorney General John Ashcroft and civil liberties abuses was a 
finalist for the Pulitzer Prize.  A series about the Bill of Rights at 200 won the Sigma Delta Chi 
Distinguished Service Medal and another about the Constitution won the Benjamin Franklin 
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 1. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST, May 16, 
2007, at A1. 
 2. See id. 
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resignations were averted by some last-minute changes in the program—
changes still not public.3 
Before Eagleton’s death, he and I had talked often about Bush and 
Ashcroft’s overzealous leadership in the war on terrorism.  Eagleton even took 
a parting shot at Ashcroft in his farewell statement handed out to friends after 
his funeral.  After calling the Iraq war one of America’s “greatest blunders,” he 
added, “[i]t will be remembered, in part, as a curse to our Constitution when 
Attorney General John Ashcroft attempted to put a democratic face on 
torture.”4  I doubt Eagleton would have changed a word of that critique, despite 
Ashcroft’s sickbed conversion to civil liberties. 
During my last days writing editorials for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in 
late 2005, Eagleton served as a sounding board helping me formulate a series 
of editorials criticizing the way that President Bush had swept away 
fundamental notions of justice in pursuing the war on terrorism.  This essay is 
based on those editorials, which I sent him shortly after I retired in early 2006.  
The editorials never ran in the newspaper, but Senator Eagleton read them and 
sent back his note of agreement, vowing to use a couple of “gems.”  The events 
that have transpired since, including Comey’s account of the hospital arm-
twisting, have only strengthened the conclusion of those editorials: in the war 
on behalf of preserving freedom, President Bush has shrunk freedom, 
perverted the rule of law and claimed kingly powers. 
The war on terrorism is not a war that will be won by the fastest jet, the 
most elusive drone, or the smartest bomb.  It will not be won by the strongest 
army, with the fastest tanks, or the most ambitious military strategy.  It won’t 
be won on the military battlefield at all.  It will be won on the battlefield of 
ideas. 
President Bush is rightly criticized for the way he has misused and 
weakened the mightiest fighting force in the history of the world.  But he 
warrants a harsher judgment on the pages of history for the way he has 
weakened America on the battlefield of ideas. 
The United States entered this war as the victim of aggression and the 
champion of freedom, self-determination, the rule of law, human rights, and 
modernism.  We faced an aggressor who had murdered thousands of innocent 
civilians in the name of an extremist ideology based on religious 
fundamentalism, medieval values, and a disregard for individual liberty, 
women’s rights, and democracy. 
Yet President Bush has lost the high ground on this battlefield of ideas—
snatching the mantle of the aggressor, undermining the rule of law, trading 
 
 3. Id. at A4. 
 4. 153 CONG. REC. S3265–3266 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2007) (Thomas F. Eagleton’s Farewell 
Address). 
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liberty for imagined security, and turning his back on a half century of 
international law that the United States led the world in creating. 
I.  SURRENDERING BASIC BELIEFS 
In this country, we believe that the government should not snoop on our 
conversations unless it convinces an independent magistrate it has reasonable 
cause. 
In this country, we don’t believe in torturing people to extract confessions, 
whether they are street thugs or prisoners of war.  We think it is uncivilized 
and inhumane and for many decades the United States led the international 
effort to banish these practices to the Dark Ages. 
In this country, we think people who are locked away have a right to know 
what the government thinks they did wrong, to face their accusers in open 
court with the help of a lawyer, and to have the matter settled by a neutral 
judge. 
In this country, we don’t think it’s fair to imprison a person for an act that 
wasn’t a crime when it was committed. 
In this country, we don’t believe in locking up people for things they say, 
even if we find those things repugnant.  Other nations, nations in the grip of 
dictatorships, do that. 
These are beliefs that separate the United States from the world’s petty 
tyrants.  They are what we mean when we talk about freedom, due process, 
human rights, and the rule of law.  Yet in his war to protect freedom from 
terrorism, President George W. Bush has diminished all of these cherished 
values. 
He and his two Attorneys General, Ashcroft and Gonzales, have placed 
them at risk by: 
 Zealously pursuing prosecutions of Muslims not directly connected to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or to other plots aimed at the United 
States.5 
 Claiming the President can act alone to authorize warrantless wiretaps of 
domestic telephone calls in the face of the requirements of the Constitution 
and the law.6 
 
 5. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Life Term Stuns Many in Court, HOUS. CHRON., 
May 4, 2006, at A1. 
 6. See, e.g., David Jackson, Gore Says Bush Overreaches Authority with Domestic Spying, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 2006, at 4A. 
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 Asserting the President can act alone to lock up detainees without the 
scrutiny of the independent judiciary because the President’s war powers 
allow him to act as a rule of one when the nation is threatened.7 
 Insisting that the President can decide by himself to sidestep the human 
rights protections of the Geneva Conventions and turn his back on a body 
of law that the United States proudly helped to create after World War II.8 
 Claiming the President can authorize the abuse of prisoners in the war on 
terrorism, even when that action violates international norms and a law 
passed by an overwhelming bipartisan majority of the Senate, which 
insisted the United States stand four-square against torture.9 
In short, too many of America’s values have been compromised in a war 
on terrorism in which the President has made kingly assertions of possessing 
unchecked authority under the President’s war powers.  This assertion of vast 
authority has upset the checks and balances vital to our constitutional structure. 
In their still frightened reactions to the September 11, 2001 attacks, many 
Americans have been too willing to overlook how many fundamental 
American values are being undermined—due process, open courts, free 
expression, fair trials, and human rights, including the belief that torture 
destroys the worth and dignity of torturer and victim alike.  
These core beliefs—beliefs that the world admired before September 11, 
2001—have been bartered away in the name of fighting terrorism.  This war 
fought in the name of freedom is instead cheapening what it means to live in 
the freest nation in the world.  If this war is a battle of ideas, as the Cold War 
was, then the President has done great damage to the cause he champions. 
II.  LOSING OUR FREEDOM TO SAVE IT 
Conventional wisdom has it that liberty must give way to security in times  
of peril.  Sometimes that is true.  A suspect with knowledge of a ticking 
nuclear bomb in an American city wouldn’t have the same rights as a traffic 
suspect.  After all, as Justice Jackson once famously wrote, we must not 
“convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”10 
Any president—Republican or Democratic, liberal or conservative—would 
have concluded in the wake of 9/11 that the President’s highest duty was to 
protect Americans from attack.  That impulse—together with the Bush 
administration’s belief that it needed to claim back presidential power lost in 
 
 7. See, e.g., Charles Lane, High Court Rejects Detainee Tribunals, WASH. POST, June 30, 
2006, at A1. 
 8. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007).   
 9. See, e.g., Josh White, President Relent: Backs Torture Ban, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, 
at A1. 
 10. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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the wake of Watergate and Vietnam—combined to form the contours of the 
Bush administration’s law enforcement response. 
But security can’t always trump freedom.  In a dictatorship, security is the 
option of first resort.  It can’t be that way in a free republic.  The true test of 
our commitment to liberty is protecting freedom during times when people are 
afraid.  It’s easy to protect freedom when everyone feels safe. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor made this point in rejecting the 
Government’s argument that it could detain without trial an American citizen 
named Yaser Hamdi.  “It is during our most challenging and uncertain 
moments,” she wrote, “that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most 
severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment 
at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”11 
There are plenty of episodes in American history when great presidents 
sacrificed liberty for security.  President Bush cites them as justifications for 
today’s actions.  But history looks back on them as mistakes, not precedents. 
The Alien and Sedition Acts made it a crime to criticize President John 
Adams.12  President Abraham Lincoln censored the press and suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus.13  The Espionage Act of World War I led to the 
imprisonment of critics of the draft.14  The Palmer Raids of 1919 locked up 
thousands of immigrants on the pretense that they were involved in anarchist 
bombings.15  President Franklin Roosevelt set up, and the Supreme Court 
permitted, concentration camps for innocent American citizens of Japanese 
descent during World War II.16  The government jailed Communist Party 
leaders as subversives during the 1940s and ’50s.17  The FBI spied on civil 
rights and anti-war leaders in the 1960s.18 
It’s easy to see the injustice when looking back.  Who watching Good 
Night and Good Luck could fail to see the demagoguery of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy (R.–Wisc.)?  The challenge is to see the injustice in real time even 
as the President waves the bloody shirt to justify his assertion of power at the 
expense of freedom. 
 
 11. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004). 
 12. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7 (May 10, 1861), reprinted in 12 Stat. 1260 (1863). 
 14. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 31–39 (1946). 
 15. See EDWIN P. HOYT, THE PALMER RAIDS (1969) (detailing the events leading up to the 
raids and their aftermath). 
 16. See MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S 
CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1976) 
 17. ROBERT K. CARR, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 1945–1950, 
1–18 (Octagon Books 1979) (1952). 
 18. MICHAEL FRIEDLY & DAVID GALLEN, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: THE FBI FILE 33–43 
(1993). 
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History can help us ask the right questions: how was Attorney General 
John Ashcroft’s decision to round up 5,000 immigrants after 9/11 and to keep 
their identities secret different from Attorney General Mitchell Palmer’s 
decision to lock up 4,000 alleged communists after his house was bombed in 
1919?  How is the life sentence for a northern Virginia imam, who urged 
young Muslims to join the “jihad,” different from the conviction of members 
of the Communist Party for advocating the overthrow of the government in the 
frightened ’50s?  How is the government’s use of more than a hundred 
thousand national security letters to obtain people’s personal correspondence 
different from FBI spying during Vietnam?  How is Mr. Bush’s assumption of 
extraordinary power to authorize warrantless wiretaps, to order the abuse of 
prisoners, and to detain suspects without court supervision different from the 
powers that Richard M. Nixon assumed during his “imperial presidency?” 
III.  WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING IN THE TWILIGHT ZONE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
AUTHORITY 
Everyone agrees that President George W. Bush had broad constitutional 
power in the days and weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to 
pursue the terrorists who murdered 3,000 of our fellow citizens. 
And everyone agrees that the National Security Agency should listen in on 
telephone conversations between al Qaeda operatives and people on U.S. soil. 
Where Mr. Bush has exceeded his power is in claiming four, five, and six 
years after 9/11 that the President alone has the power to order these wiretaps 
without warrants, without a detached magistrate reviewing the government’s 
case and without the explicit approval of Congress.19 
In making this argument, Mr. Bush threatens to turn the rule of law into 
one-man rule. 
It’s happened before.  During the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman 
seized the nation’s steel mills claiming that a threatened nationwide strike 
would hurt the national defense.20  Like Mr. Bush, he claimed that his power as 
Commander in Chief gave him the authority to act.21 
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion rejecting Truman’s steel seizure has 
been the touchstone of presidential power ever since.  Justice Jackson said the 
President’s power is at its maximum when he acts with express or implied 
congressional authorization.22  He said the President is in a “zone of twilight” 
when there was no authorization.23  And the President’s power is at its “lowest 
 
 19. See Jackson, supra note 6. 
 20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952). 
 21. Id. at 582. 
 22. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 23. Id. at 637. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] TOM EAGLETON AND THE “CURSE TO OUR CONSTITUTION” 115 
ebb” when he acts in the face of express or implied congressional 
disagreement.24 
The President claims that he acted at the zenith of his power because 
Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force resolution three 
days after the 9/11 attack.25  The resolution authorized the President to use “all 
necessary and appropriate force” to respond to the attacks.26  This, Mr. Bush 
claims, was an express approval of his action to order warrantless wiretaps of 
conversations between al Qaeda suspects and persons on U.S. soil.27  Signals 
intelligence has been important to war efforts all through U.S. history and 
warrantless wiretaps of foreign agents have been authorized since at least 
Franklin Roosevelt, the President says.28 
Critics say that instead of the President acting at the zenith of his powers—
or even the twilight zone like Truman—he was at his lowest ebb because 
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978 
requiring warrants from a secret intelligence court for wiretaps of 
conversations between intelligence agents and people on U.S. soil.29 
The prevailing view among independent legal scholars is that the critics 
have the stronger argument.30  The specific FISA law, which directly addresses 
wiretaps, trumps the more general war resolution which didn’t specifically say 
anything about wiretaps.31  This is why a number of well-respected 
Republicans, such as Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and Lindsey 
Graham of South Carolina, have joined Democrats in disputing the legality of 
the wiretaps and calling for a congressional response.32  During 2006 hearings 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Republicans and Democrats said they 
had no idea they were approving the warrantless wiretapping when they voted 
for the war resolution.33 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2a, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Editorial, War Doesn’t Trump Constitution, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 20, 2006, 
at 2E. 
 28. See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance 
Authority: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12–13 (2006) (statement 
of Alberto R. Gonzalez, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 29. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (Supp. IV 2000). 
 30. See, e.g., Sarah M. Riley, Constitutional Crisis of Deja Vu?: The War Power, The Bush 
Administration and the War on Terror, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 701, 735 (2007); John C. Sims, What 
NSA Is Doing and Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 139 (2006). 
 31. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Untold Story of al Qaeda’s Administrative Law 
Dilemmas, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1302, 1362 (2007). 
 32. Michael Isikoff et al., Bush’s Bad Connection, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 2006, at 30–32. 
 33. Wartime Executive Power and the NSA’s Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 641 (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking 
Member, S. Judiciary Comm.). 
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No one is arguing that wiretaps of suspected al Qaeda agents should not 
occur—just that there should be a detached review of the reasonableness of the 
wiretaps when they involve conversations on U.S. soil that might involve al 
Qaeda.  The secret FISA court grants almost all warrants requested.34 For the 
administration to argue that its opponents jeopardize national security is a scare 
tactic. 
It is also a red herring for the President to claim that the disclosure of the 
secret wiretap program hurt national security.35  The emptiness of that claim 
was apparent when Attorney General Gonzales was asked at Senate hearings if 
he thought al Qaeda had been unaware that its phones were tapped.  The 
Attorney General lamely responded: “It is true that the enemy is presuming 
some kind of surveillance, but if they are not reminded of it in the newspapers, 
they sometimes forget.”36 
One of the President’s most dubious arguments is that he had to ignore the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 because the law is outmoded and 
takes too much time and too much proof to get warrants.37  “The FISA law was 
written in 1978,” the President said at a press conference.  “We’re having this 
discussion in 2006.  It’s a different world.”38 
If the FISA law is too slow, then the President should ask Congress to fix 
the problem.  That’s the way democracies work.  Presidents can’t just decide 
that thirty-year-old laws are outmoded and choose to ignore them. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees that people will be free 
from unreasonable searches, the decision to search is supposed to be made by a 
detached judge, not a government agent.39  That either means that more judges 
will have to be made available to the NSA, or there will have to be improved 
oversight of the process to guard against abuses.  As the program was set up by 
the President, it is too easy for a government agent to wiretap, without a 
warrant, conversations between a journalist or a professor, on the one hand, 
and a Hamas party official or an Islamic fundamentalist on the other—even 
when these Islamic fundamentalists are uninvolved in terrorism. 
Before the New York Times published the NSA story, President Bush 
warned its top editors at a White House meeting that they would have blood on 
 
 34. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Defending Spy Program, Administration Cites Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20. 
 35. George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051217.html. 
 36. Tim Grieve, Alberto Gonzales and the Forgetful Terrorists, SALON, Feb. 7, 2006, 
available at http://www.salon.com/politics/war_room/2006/02/07/memories/index.html. 
 37. William Branigin, Bush Opposes Release of Photos With Abramoff, WASH. POST., Jan. 
26, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2006/01/26/AR2006012601228_pf.html. 
 38. Id. 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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their hands if they revealed the secret wiretapping program and there was 
another 9/11.40  After publication, Attorney General Gonzales warned that the 
disclosure of this and another top-secret program about terrorist financing 
might violate the ninety-year-old Espionage Act41—even though the law never 
has been used against journalists.42 
But the administration has not presented convincing evidence of national 
security damage from this or any other leak.  At a meeting of law professors in 
early 2007 where I was a participant, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant 
Attorney General for the National Security Division, spoke of experiences he 
had in criminal cases in which leaks damaged a Justice Department 
investigation; but Wainstein’s main examples did not involve national security 
cases.43  Wainstein’s national security examples included two old, well-
publicized cases—the Chicago Tribune’s 1942 disclosure that the United 
States had broken the Japanese code and the disclosure in the 1970s of CIA 
agents’ names by former CIA employee Philip Agee.  Nearly all journalists 
agree these kinds of disclosures are highly unethical.  The one recent example 
cited by Wainstein was stories and telephone calls by New York Times 
reporters Judith Miller and Philip Shenon in 2001 that tipped off two Islamic 
charities that their assets might be frozen by the government.44  No claim was 
made that lives were jeopardized. 
Viewed with historical distance, the New York Times’s NSA disclosures 
are paradigmatic examples of the press performing its watchdog function with 
resulting reforms.  The administration announced a little more than a year after 
the Times’s stories that it would change its secret program to bring it under the 
FISA court.45  It remains unclear, however, whether the changes bring the 
program in total compliance with the law and the Constitution.46 
No one wants to open the door to another 9/11.  Everyone wants the 
government to connect the dots.  But the nation can achieve its security goals 
without giving up its cherished freedoms or handing the President monarchical 
power. 
 
 40. Philip Taubman, Why We Publish Secrets, Address Before the Paul Simon Public Policy 
Institute, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, (Sept. 26, 2006). 
 41. Walter Pincus, Prosecution of Journalists is Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May 
22, 2006, at A4. 
 42. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense 
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 938 (1973). 
 43. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Program of the National Security Law Section, Assoc. of 
American Law Schools Meeting (Jan. 4, 2007). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Dan Eggen, Court Will Oversee Wiretap Program, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2007, at A1. 
 46. Id. at A4. 
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IV.  JAMES OTIS, MEET JOHN DOE 
In 1761, James Otis laid the foundation of the right of privacy when he 
delivered a five-hour oration to a British colonial court attacking the detested 
“writs of assistance” that the British used to search the houses of Bostonians.47 
The writs allowed the British to search homes, shops, and ships at any time 
for any reason without a warrant.48  Otis said this power threatened to 
“annihilate” “one of the most essential branches of English liberty . . . the 
freedom of one’s house.”  Otis asserts, “It is a power that places the liberty of 
every man in the hands of every petty officer.”49  When the new nation wrote a 
Bill of Rights, Otis’s sentiments were written into the Fourth Amendment, 
which protects people’s homes and papers from unreasonable government 
searches.50 
Yet today, individual agents of the FBI issue tens of thousands of National 
Security Letters every year for all manner of personal information about 
people’s private lives.51  No need for a judge.  No need to show that a person 
might have done something wrong. 
If James Otis were alive today he wouldn’t have as much freedom to 
contest National Security Letters in federal court as he had to contest writs of 
assistance in Britain’s colonial courts.  The Patriot Act52 made it a crime for a 
person who receives a National Security Letter to publicly disclose it to anyone 
other than his lawyer.53  It also gagged the recipient’s lawyer; Otis wouldn’t be 
able to say whom he represented.  In fact, for a time after the passage of the 
Patriot Act, the recipient couldn’t have contacted a lawyer.54 
This extraordinary and un-American power was challenged by three 
Connecticut librarians, designated John Does in court papers.55  One “John 
Doe” is George Christian, executive director of a consortium of libraries called 
the Library Connection.56  Christian’s name became public because the 
Government failed to blot it out in court filings.57  FBI agents handed Christian 
 
 47. National Humanities Institute, James Otis Against Writs of Assistance, February 1761, 
available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 51. Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1. 
 52. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.). 
 53. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(c) (Supp. 2007) (originally enacted as USA Patriot Act of Oct. 26, 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68–69 (D. Conn. 2005), dismissed as moot by 449 
F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 56. Gellman, supra note 51.  
 57. Id. 
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a National Security Letter demanding the names of all persons who used a 
particular library computer and warned him to never reveal the request to 
anyone.58  Despite Christian’s unveiling, the courts continued to uphold the 
fiction that his identity is a state secret.59  The government claimed that 
national security would somehow be damaged if his name were revealed.60  
 National Security Letters were an invention of the 1970s designed for 
espionage and terrorism investigations.61  They required the Government to 
show a specific link to a suspected foreign agent.62  But the Patriot Act, in 
breaking down the wall between intelligence investigations and criminal 
investigations, greatly expanded government authority to get private records 
about U.S. citizens without any specific link to a suspected terrorist.63 
Letters can be issued on the authority of an FBI supervisor without court 
supervision, giving the government access to records showing how a person 
earns money, whom she lives with, what he reads, whom she communicates 
with on the phone or by email, where he buys things online, where she travels, 
and how much he gambles and borrows.64  Certain patterns could identify 
potential terrorists—or so the argument goes. 
The problem is that much of the information concerns citizens who have 
no idea they are being scrutinized and have nothing to do with terrorism.  
Citizens have no way of knowing that their records have been sucked into the 
government’s dragnet; the letters are issued to the businesses that hold the 
records, such as bookstores, internet service providers, and credit card 
companies.  It is illegal for those businesses to tell people that their records are 
being sent to the FBI.65  In addition, the records are retained indefinitely 
because Attorney General Ashcroft rescinded a 1995 guideline that had 
required the letters be destroyed if they proved irrelevant to the purpose for 
which they were collected.66 
National Security Letters violate American norms of justice in almost 
every conceivable way.  There is no requirement for probable cause or even 
reasonable suspicion.67  People do not know that the government is snooping 
on their private lives, and even if they did it is difficult to challenge a National 
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Security Letter in court.  Christian did not know if he could consult a lawyer or 
tell his board. 68 
Until 2007, no one outside the government knew how many National 
Security Letters were issued by the FBI.  The Washington Post reported in 
2005 that the government is using 30,000 a year.69  The Bush Justice 
Department responded to that disclosure by saying that number was 
“erroneous,” but refusing to release the right number.70 
The number did turn out to be erroneous—erroneously low.  A study by 
the Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine found that the number 
of National Security Letters rose to 56,000 a year in 2004 from just 8,500 
before passage of the Patriot Act.71  Fine also found “widespread and serious 
misuse” of the letters by the FBI.72 
The recent reauthorization of the Patriot Act fixed some of these problems 
by requiring a reasonable amount of evidence that records are relevant to an 
investigation and requiring a higher-up in the FBI to approve the letters.73  One 
provision allows a recipient of a National Security Letter to contact a lawyer 
and to reveal its identity.74 After the revisions, the government admitted that 
Christian could seek a lawyer and reveal his name.75  Still, the person whose 
records are sought does not find out about the letters, nor have a chance to 
challenge the letter in court. 
The compromise allows a person who receives a letter to challenge the gag 
that prohibits her from telling anyone except her lawyer.76  Within the first 
year, a court may set aside the gag if it finds there is “no reason to believe that 
disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States, interfere 
with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere 
the diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of any 
person.”77  But, if the government asserts that disclosure would violate national 
security or interfere with diplomatic relations, then the court cannot set aside 
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the gag unless it finds the government is acting in bad faith.78  After one year, 
if the government recertifies the national security danger, that assertion is 
considered “conclusive.”79  Judges may not assess the claim’s validity, but 
only whether it is made in “bad faith.”80 
The compromise was supposed to exempt libraries from receiving National 
Security Letters, but the library exemption does not cover internet services at 
libraries, such as email.81  Most important, these improvements do not fix the 
basic flaw: the government does not have to prove a connection between the 
records sought and a terrorist. 
Just as the custom house officers entered the colonists’ homes on bare 
suspicion, FBI agents rummage through Americans’ private information 
unmindful of the cherished liberty lost.  As in Mr. Otis’s day, the liberty of 
every man is in the hands of every petty officer. 
V.  SURRENDERING THE MORAL HIGH GROUND 
Who would have thought that the day would come when the symbol of 
America in parts of the world was the image of a hooded prisoner with his 
arms hooked to electrical wires? 
Who would have thought that America would run secret prison camps in 
Eastern Europe, shuttling nameless detainees through European capitals on 
“ghost flights” and using “extraordinary rendition” to send prisoners to 
countries notorious for torture? 
Who would have thought that the President and the Vice President would 
fight a hero and former prisoner of war to preserve the prerogative to treat 
prisoners in cruel, inhuman, or degrading ways? 
Who would have thought in the days after September 11, 2001 that the 
United States would surrender the moral high ground and wind up with the 
image of a human rights abuser? 
Who would have thought that after a century leading the world’s effort to 
bring civilized standards to the treatment of prisoners of war, the United States 
would turn its back on the proud accomplishments of Nuremberg and the 
Geneva Conventions? 
Who would have thought the United States would be the aggressor and 
invade another country in a preemptive war that the Secretary General of the 
United Nations said was probably illegal? 
Yet all of these developments have come to pass as President George W. 
Bush has pursued the war on terrorism heedless of history. 
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The great invention of the Nuremberg war crimes trials was that the victors 
agreed to submit the fate of evil perpetrators of the Holocaust to the rule of 
law. 
Robert H. Jackson, the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, said the decision of 
“four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury [to] stay the 
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the 
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever 
paid to Reason.”82 
For half a century, the world built on this idea that law could punish war 
crimes.  It was an idea behind the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Convention Against Torture in 1984.83 
But after 9/11, the Bush White House determined that this grand creation 
of international justice was “obsolete” in the face of the war on terrorism, and 
that Taliban captured in Afghanistan were not entitled to the protection of the 
Conventions.84  For the first time in post-World War II history, the United 
States refused to extend the protections of the Geneva Conventions to its 
opponents on the battlefield, one of several arguments that Secretary of State 
Colin Powell made in a memo opposing Gonzales.85  Powell wrote that 
Gonzales would “reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in 
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the law 
of war for our troops.”86  In the end, reason surrendered to power and President 
Bush adopted Gonzales’s position.87 
By denying Geneva protections to the Taliban and other prisoners, Bush 
hoped he could use rough interrogations to prevent another 9/11.  
Waterboarding—where a prisoner is tied to a board and made to think he is 
drowning—elicited information from 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed about possible future terrorist targets; in fact, Mohammed 
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admitted to involvement in so many plots—thirty-one in all—that some 
experts on interrogations questioned whether he was giving reliable 
confessions.88 
Tortured confessions often are unreliable.89  The Bush administration’s 
pre-war claim that Iraq was helping al Qaeda make bombs of poisons and 
gases came from a Libyan prisoner handed over to Egypt for interrogation 
under a process called extraordinary rendition; the prisoner later said he made 
up the claim to avoid Egyptian torture.90  But by that time, President Bush had 
used the information to justify invading Iraq.91 
The unreliability of confessions induced by torture is one reason the British 
House of Lords ruled in 2005 that the government could not use that evidence 
in court.92  Lord Bingham wrote that the English common law had “set its face 
firmly against the use of torture” for more than 300 years: “[T]he common law 
was moved by the cruelty of the practice . . . by the inherent unreliability of 
confessions . . . and by the belief that it degraded all who lent themselves to 
[it].”93 
President Bush, when he made his initial decision to use brutal 
interrogation techniques, probably did not foresee that opening the dungeon 
door would lead inevitably to Abu Ghraib.  But there is no excuse now for 
failing to recognize the cause-and-effect relationship he set in motion. 
Yet, to this day, the President has refused to take responsibility for the 
mistreatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.  He has blamed 
renegade military police while trotting out multiple Pentagon investigations to 
whitewash the responsibility of higher-ups for the Abu Ghraib scandal.94 
In fact, the responsibility lies squarely with President Bush, Vice President 
Dick Cheney, Alberto Gonzales, and former Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld.  In the face of complaints from FBI agents and principled objections 
by top military lawyers,95 administration hawks allied with the Vice President 
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and Secretary Rumsfeld approved brutal interrogation techniques that were 
employed at Guantanamo Bay and that later migrated to Abu Ghraib.96 
The New Yorker recounted in 2006 the frustrating attempts of Alberto J. 
Mora, retired General Counsel of the Navy, to stop the brutality.97 
In December, 2002, Navy criminal investigators brought to Mora their 
concerns about abusive interrogations at Guantanamo.98  Mora, a rock-ribbed 
Bush Republican, was shocked to discover that Rumsfeld had approved 
hooding to exploit phobias, stress positions, deprivation of light—all forbidden 
practices that could subject military interrogators to prosecution under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.99 
Pentagon and Justice Department lawyers had invented elaborate rationales 
to justify the practices.  Pentagon lawyer, Lt. Col. Diane Beaver, suggested that 
interrogators could get immunity in advance from their superiors.100  Justice 
Department lawyer John Yoo wrote an Office of Legal Counsel opinion that 
the President’s war power permitted him to authorize “cruel, inhumane, and 
degrading treatment” of prisoners.101  Mora says that Yoo told him point blank 
that the President could authorize “torture.”102 
Mora disagreed.  He said the international conventions ratified by the 
Senate had the force of law that bound President and interrogator alike.103 
After this quiet, behind-the-scenes debate with internal critics, Bush and 
Cheney fought a loud, public battle with Senator John McCain, R.-Ariz., trying 
for months during 2005 to defeat his legislative ban on “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading” interrogations.104 
From the beginning of the war on terrorism, the Bush administration had 
taken the view that the President has sole authority to decide how enemy 
combatants in the war on terrorism would be interrogated.  In a 2002 memo 
justifying abusive interrogation techniques, the Justice Department said, 
“Congress can no more interfere with the President’s conduct of the 
interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical 
decisions on the battlefield.”105  The memo went on to say, remarkably, that 
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“[p]hysical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the 
pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment 
of bodily function, or even death.”106 
Senator McCain was tortured as a prisoner of war in Vietnam.107  He 
recalled in a Senate speech that one inner belief that sustained him and other 
POWs was that “every one of us . . . knew and took great strength from the 
belief that we were different from our enemies. . . .”108 
When it became clear that the McCain anti-torture provision would pass, 
President Bush agreed to sign it.109  But what he gave with the signing pen he 
took back with a signing statement.110  The statement said he would interpret 
the McCain ban “consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to 
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and 
consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power.”111 
In other words, the President could authorize any interrogation technique 
he thought was necessary, and there was nothing Congress or the courts could 
do about it. 
Alberto Mora thinks that the decision of top officials to authorize abuse 
was as morally reprehensible as the actual torture at Abu Ghraib: 
If cruelty is no longer declared unlawful, but instead is applied as a matter of 
policy, it alters the fundamental relationship of man to government. . . .  The 
Constitution recognizes that man has an inherent right . . . to personal dignity, 
including the right to be free of cruelty.  It applies to all human beings. . . .112 
If we do not preserve this special relationship between man and 
government, if we do not preserve the unique quality that sustained John 
McCain in a Hanoi prison, then we will have lost that precious intangible that 
we are fighting the war on terrorism to preserve—our nation’s belief that the 
rule of law protects the inherent worth and dignity of every person against 
abusive governments, maniacal dictators, murderous ideologies, and even 
democratically elected presidents of the freest country in the world. 
Just as President Bush has claimed unlimited presidential power to order 
abusive interrogation techniques, he also has claimed it for the process, or lack 
thereof, available to those detained as enemy combatants.  He asserted that he 
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could create military tribunals to try the enemy combatants—tribunals that lack 
so many of the elements of due process that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled they 
did not comply with the Constitution.113  The tribunals do not allow the 
accused to confront key accusers or to know secret evidence against them; they 
also do not guarantee the right to a lawyer, do not allow lawyers full access to 
clients, and deny the Great Writ of habeas corpus.114  In Hamdi, Justice 
O’Connor rejected this assertion of presidential authority.  The Court held that 
citizens held as enemy combatants must have a “fair opportunity to rebut” the 
government’s claims.115 
The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected President Bush’s broad claim of 
executive power in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision in 2006, ruling that the 
President could not, on his own, set up tribunals to try enemy combatants and 
could not ignore the Geneva Conventions when Congress said that 
international law applied to such tribunals.116  The President responded by 
asking Congress to pass the Military Commission Act, and a Congress of 
Republicans and cowed Democrats approved the law.117  The Democrats in 
Congress were especially timid because the bill came up in the late summer 
and early fall and appeared to be an attempt to make Democrats appear weak 
on terrorism as the 2006 congressional elections approached.118  The law 
overturned Hamdan and stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear 
habeas corpus appeals from alien enemy combatants, whether they have been 
found by the Combat Status Review Tribunal to have been properly detained 
or whether they are awaiting that determination.119 
This was an extraordinary law.  As Berkeley Law Professor and 
constitutional expert Jesse Choper put it, except in isolated cases during the 
Civil War and World War II, “Congress had never engaged in clear removal of 
cases from the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts.”120 
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It should never be possible for Congress to remove a whole category of 
cases from the jurisdiction of all federal courts, inferior and supreme.  To allow 
such a law to stand would seriously undermine the checks and balances of the 
Constitution, already seriously eroded by Congress’s failure to check the 
President’s excessive assertions of authority. 
A brave member of the Army Reserve who was involved in handling the 
cases of the detainees—Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham—has filed an affidavit with 
the U.S. Supreme Court that paints a highly damaging picture of the operation 
of the President’s tribunals.121  He says that intelligence officials assembling 
the case against detainees would not assure him that they had provided any 
exculpatory evidence.122  More damaging, he told of serving on one of the 
review boards and concluding along with fellow board members that the 
government had not provided enough proof that one particular detainee was an 
enemy combatant.123  When the board made that ruling, it was told to take 
another look.124  It stood by its decision, but Abraham was never again put on 
one of the boards.125 
At the end of the Supreme Court’s 2006–2007 term, it agreed to hear the 
case to decide if detainees have a right to challenge their detention in American 
courts.126 
VI.  CHASING PHANTOMS 
The First Amendment says that people generally cannot be put in prison 
for things they say.127  But Ali al Timimi, an imam from northern Virginia, 
faces life in prison without parole for words spoken over dinner to followers 
who never attacked the United States.128 
The Fifth Amendment says every suspect has a right to remain silent.129  
But, the Bush administration outsourced the Fifth Amendment to Saudi 
Arabian security police who secured a confession from Ahmed Omar Abu Ali 
for plotting to kill the President.130 
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The American legal system insists that people are innocent until proven 
guilty.131  But under the Patriot Act, the Bush administration put Illinois 
charities out of business for alleged ties to al Qaeda, which were never proven 
in court.132 
The Constitution bans ex post facto laws because we do not believe that 
people can be sent to prison for acts that were not illegal when they 
occurred.133  But the government prosecuted two former college professors for 
aiding Palestinian groups that were not considered terrorist organizations at the 
time of their assistance.134 
Perhaps, if the Bush-Ashcroft-Gonzales tactics had clearly made us safer 
from the people who murdered our brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, 
sons and daughters on 9/11, their legal tactics might somehow be forgiven.  
But there is little evidence that the prosecutions have made us safer because 
few of those convicted were plotting to kill Americans. 
The Justice Department says it foiled a number of possible attacks, 
including one involving Iyman Faris, an Ohio trucker, who pleaded guilty in 
2003 to involvement in an al Qaeda plot to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge.135  
In recent cases, where cells of would-be terrorists have been rightfully arrested, 
those plotting attacks on soldiers at Fort Dix and fuel tanks at JFK airport in 
New York were far from having the means to carry out their evil intentions.136 
With Attorney General Alberto Gonzales flanking him, President Bush 
claimed in 2005 that “federal terrorism investigations have resulted in charges 
against more than 400 suspects, and more than half of those charged have been 
convicted.”137 
But a study by Syracuse University and an analysis by The Washington 
Post found that few “terrorism” cases actually were related to terrorism.138  
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The Post found that 39 people, not 200, had been convicted of crimes related 
to terrorism or national security.139  Syracuse University, which provides the 
most reliable study of Justice Department statistics, found that the average 
sentence in “terrorism” cases after 9/11 was just twenty-eight days and that the 
median sentence was zero because most charges were dismissed.140  Only one 
percent of the 6,500 terrorism or anti-terrorism criminal referrals resulted in 
sentences of twenty or more years.141  Nearly four out of five of these referrals 
were dropped before trial; of the nearly 1,400 sentenced, only 67 received 
sentences of five or more years.142  The Syracuse researchers also found that 
the initial surge of “terrorism” prosecutions immediately after 9/11 has ended 
and that the current level of prosecutions is closer to the pre-9/11 level.143  The 
researchers point out that this raises questions about the post-9/11 surge 
because the threat of terrorism is not thought to have decreased since then.144 
A pattern has become disconcertingly familiar.  The government makes 
alarming claims of terrorist plots.  Then the facts fall short of the sensational 
claims.  Attorney General Ashcroft warned of a dirty bomb plot by Jose 
Padilla, and the government held the U.S. citizen145 in a Navy brig for three 
years before filing charges that had nothing to do with a dirty bomb plot.146  
The bait and switch left one of Bush’s favorite judges, J. Michael Luttig, 
wondering whether the military detention was justified and led him to write 
that there had been a “substantial cost to the government’s credibility” 
resulting in the government’s long detention of Padilla for alleged terrorist 
plans it did not prove in court.147 
Ashcroft warned that an Oregon lawyer was connected to the Madrid 
terrorist bombing, but that was based on an FBI mistake.148  He claimed that a 
Detroit cell endangered Americans, but a judge threw out the convictions of 
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two Muslim men because prosecutors ignored evidence that did not fit their 
theory.149 
Twenty of the Government’s terrorism convictions are for Iraqi men who 
pleaded guilty in a Pennsylvania truck licensing scheme, but the scheme had 
nothing to do with terrorism.150  Six Yemini men from Lackawanna, New York 
were convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda because they 
attended training camps overseas, but that was before 9/11 and the men never 
took steps toward a terrorist act.151 
Even in its showcase prosecution of the so-called paintball jihadists of 
Northern Virginia where the government won eight convictions, the so-called 
terrorists never posed a threat to an American citizen here or abroad.152 
The imam at the center of the prosecution of the “Virginia jihadists” was 
Ali al Timimi, a Ph.D. cancer researcher who was an influential leader of 
young American Muslims at a store front mosque in Falls Church, Virginia153 
One follower was Randall “Ismail” Royer, a graduate of Parkway South in 
affluent west St. Louis County.154  He pleaded guilty to violating the seldom-
enforced Neutrality Act of 1794155 to support Lashkar e-Taiba, a militant 
Muslim group fighting for the independence of Kashmir from India.156  The 
following account of the prosecution of al Timimi and other Muslims in 
America is largely based on excellent reporting by a former colleague of mine 
at the Post-Dispatch, Jon Sawyer, now director of the Pulitzer Center on Crisis 
Reporting; Sawyer, like Eagleton, served as a muse for the ill-fated editorials I 
wrote for the Post-Dispatch. 
Royer and the other conspirators allegedly trained at a paintball course in 
the woods.  He and three others went to a Lashkar camp in 2001, before 
December 2001 when the Lashkar group was declared a terrorist organization 
for attacking the Indian Parliament.  Prosecutors maintained that training with 
the group amounted to an “attack” on India in violation of the Neutrality 
Act.157 
Two of the men who traveled to Pakistan after 9/11 got reduced sentences 
by pleading guilty and testifying against Timimi.158  They testified that at a 
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private dinner five days after 9/11, Timimi had told them that it was their 
religious duty to fight for Islam abroad and that this included defending the 
Taliban against U.S. forces.159  AL Timimi claims he told his followers to go 
abroad to guard against an anti-Muslim backlash in the United States.160  In 
any event, none of the followers fought against the United States or U.S. 
allies.161 
For his words—and his words alone—Timimi was convicted of inciting 
his followers to wage war against the United States.162  U.S. District Judge 
Leonie M. Brinkema called the life sentence she imposed “very draconian,” 
but said her hands were tied by federal sentencing rules involving gun 
crimes.163 
Speech alone can sometimes be illegal, but only when it incites a person to 
an imminent criminal act.164  Based on the evidence, an attack on American 
troops or U.S. soil never was imminent or even planned.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court should review al Timimi’s trial and “draconian” sentence. 
The prosecutor in the case was U.S. Attorney Paul McNulty, who later 
became Deputy Attorney General with hardly a murmur of criticism from 
either Democrats or Republicans in the Congress.165  He said Timimi deserved 
the life sentence because he was “a kingpin of hate against America and 
everything we stand for, especially our freedom.”166 
AL Timimi made an eloquent statement to the court, quoting from the 
Constitution and Socrates.167  Previously, he had pointed out that he had “never 
owned or used a gun, never traveled to a military camp, never set foot in a 
country in which a war was taking place, never raised money for any violent 
organization.”168  For his conviction to stand, he said: 
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[T]wo hundred and thirty years of America’s tradition of protecting the 
individual from the tyrannies and whims of the sovereign will have come to an 
end.  And that which is exploited today to persecute a single member of a 
minority will most assuredly come back to haunt the majority tomorrow.169 
VII.  OUTSOURCING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Ahmed Abu Ali—a pious twenty-four year old Muslim American who 
grew up in northern Virginia before studying in Saudi Arabia—was convicted 
late in 2005 of plotting to assassinate President George W. Bush and hijack 
commercial airliners.170  The conviction was based almost entirely on a 
confession he made while in custody of the Mubahith, Saudi Arabia’s state 
security service known for torturing prisoners.171 
Prosecutor McNulty said the verdict “firmly established Abu Ali as a 
dangerous terrorist who posed a grave threat to our national security.”172  But 
the trial violated important standards of American justice.  Again, this account 
is based on excellent stories by Sawyer, with additional information from 
original court documents. 
The trial was conducted under the pretense that Americans had nothing to 
do with Abu Ali’s detention in Saudi Arabia, even though Saudi officials told 
news organizations that they were holding him for U.S. convenience.173  FBI 
agents on the scene fed questions to Saudi interrogators and watched behind 
one-way glass.174 
The judge, Gerald Bruce Lee, allowed the prosecution to introduce Abu 
Ali’s confession as “voluntary,” despite Abu Ali’s claim that Saudi 
interrogators “whipped” him, slapped him in the face, pulled his beard, ears 
and hair, kicked him in the stomach, and put him in a cell that was lit twenty-
four hours a day.175  A U.S. doctor confirmed ten linear scars on his back 
consistent with whipping.176  The jury convicted Abu Ali without knowing that 
Saudi Arabia has a history of torturing prisoners.177 
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Ever since the Bill of Rights was written, it has stood for the principle that 
the federal government cannot force a suspect to be a witness against 
himself.178  It is a principle that is essential to a government that respects the 
integrity and dignity of the individual over the demands of the state.  If the 
conviction of Abu Ali stands, the Fifth Amendment has become a meaningless 
anachronism in the war on terrorism. 
VIII.  ABUSING THE PATRIOT ACT 
Former Attorney General Ashcroft pointed to the prosecution of two 
former college professors as Patriot Act success stories.179  The professors are 
Abdelhaleem Ashqar, a former Howard University professor, and Sami Al-
Arian, a former computer professor at the University of South Florida at 
Tampa.180 
The Patriot Act opened up to prosecutors a trove of secret wiretaps 
collected by intelligence agents.181  But critics point out that charges against 
both men are based upon decade-old actions that were not illegal at the time.182 
Mr. Ashqar, who lives in northern Virginia, grew up on the West Bank.183  
His grandfather was jailed by the Ottoman Empire.184  His father was jailed by 
the British Empire.185  Mr. Ashqar himself was jailed by Israel.186  Finally, he 
was brought to trial in America.187  The government charged that in the early 
1990s, as a student at the University of Mississippi, Mr. Ashqar helped launder 
one million dollars for Hamas.188 The evidence came from FBI wiretaps and a 
break-in at his apartment.189  The searches were conducted as intelligence 
operations without search warrants at a time when the United States did not 
consider Hamas a terrorist group.190  In early 2007, a jury found Ashqar 
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innocent of the most serious charge against him, racketeering, convicting him 
on lesser charges that should result in a shorter prison sentence.191  The 
government used the same approach in the al Arian case, and failed to 
convince a jury there too.192  Mr. al Arian was acquitted in December, 2005 of 
eight counts growing out of the Government claim that he conspired to commit 
terrorist murders in Israel as the U.S. boss of the Islamic Jihad.193  The jury 
could not reach a verdict on nine other charges and al Arian subsequently 
agreed to a plea bargain and was deported.194 
The government had been investigating Mr. al Arian since shortly after he 
arrived at the university in 1986.195  His fiery speeches called for “death to 
Israel.”196  But he considered himself an “enlightened Islamist” and 
campaigned for George W. Bush in 2000.197  He publicly condemned the 9/11 
attacks.198  Time Magazine reported that an FBI supervisor involved in the case 
was “in shock” when he received the “marching orders” from Mr. Ashcroft to 
build a case against Mr. al Arian.199 
Much of the evidence presented at trial involved fundraising from the early 
1990s that was not illegal then.200  The judge insisted that the government 
prove that Mr. al Arian knew he was funding the terrorist activities of Islamic 
Jihad.201  It could not.202  Jurors said they acquitted Mr. al Arian because a jury 
instruction told them, “Our law does not criminalize beliefs or mere 
membership in an organization.”203 
The government used another provision of the Patriot Act to destroy two 
Illinois charities by freezing their assets.204  The investigations of Global Relief 
and Benevolence International were based partly on an uncorroborated CIA tip 
in late 2001 that Global Relief was involved in a plot to attack the United 
States with weapons of mass destruction.205  The government entered the 
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offices of Global Relief and Benevolence International around the world to 
swab for evidence of WMDs.206 Failing to find evidence, the government used 
its new Patriot Act powers to freeze the charities’ assets while it tried to build 
criminal cases.207  The Justice Department did not file charges against Global 
Relief,208 but locked up a top Global fund-raiser, Rabih Haddad.209 
Mr. Haddad was a respected moderate religious leader in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan.210  He was placed in solitary confinement while awaiting a closed 
hearing,211 and was eventually deported for a minor visa violation.212  In a 
jailhouse letter to “Lady Liberty,” Mr. Haddad said that America’s vision of 
liberty had once “swept me up in a tornado of hope, dreams, and 
inspiration . . . .  Little did I know that I will be persecuted in your 
name . . . .”213 
U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald won an indictment of the director of 
Benevolence International, Enaam Arnaout.214  Mr. Ashcroft personally 
traveled to Chicago to announce the indictment, stressing the organization’s 
links to al Qaeda.215  The 9/11 Commission concluded that “the indictment . . . 
contained almost no specific allegations that [the group] funded al Qaeda.”216  
Eventually, Arnaout pled guilty to diverting charitable funds to Bosnian 
fighters—whom the United States supported —but the Government dropped 
all counts related to terrorism and al Qaeda.217  The 9/11 Commission 
concluded that the Patriot Act powers wielded so powerfully by the 
government had “potentially dangerous applications when applied to domestic 
institutions.”218  Organizations can be shut down on a single official’s say-so 
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based on a newspaper article, hearsay, or classified evidence that the group 
never sees.219 
It is a process that makes a mockery of due process.  The criticism of the 
Bush administration’s prosecutions of Arab-Americans has not gotten much 
attention.  Most of us have trouble empathizing with radical Islamists.  But 
American values, not Islamic values, are at stake when the government distorts 
the law to imprison people only vaguely tied to the war on terrorism.  Only real 
and present threats to American lives and institutions justify restrictions on 
liberty or special procedures that bypass the protections of the legal system. 
When the government surrenders freedom in pursuit of phantom threats, it 
diverts resources from the real culprits and jeopardizes the core values that we 
are fighting this war to preserve. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Jackson, more than any other American jurist, grasped the 
important issues of presidential power and the need to temper victors’ justice 
with international law.  He served as the chief prosecutor at Nuremberg and 
also wrote the Court’s definitive opinion on presidential war power in the Steel 
Seizure case.220  To paraphrase Justice Jackson’s words at Nuremberg—for a 
great and powerful nation to abide by the rule of law at a time when it is most 
tempted to abandon law is a victory of reason over power.221  It is a victory of 
modernity over the Dark Ages.  It is the victory of the pen and the word 
processor over the dungeon.  It is the victory of civilization over barbarity. 
This submission of power to the rule of law is what protects liberty of the 
individual.  To abandon the law and surrender liberty to fear is to give the 
terrorists a victory on the battlefield that matters and on which this war will be 
decided—the battlefield of ideas. 
George Bush, Dick Cheney, John Ashcroft, and Alberto Gonzales do not 
understand what important freedoms they are sacrificing by turning their backs 
on basic American values of justice.  Tom Eagleton not only understood, but 
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